Balance Power

Jon and his wife share their time between Abu Dhabi and a new home in Charlotte, NC. They are tired of renting cars when they come back to the States and want a comfortable ride, with reasonable power, hauling capacity, and reliability. With a budget of about $25,000, what should they buy?

(Welcome back to What Car Should You Buy? Where we give real people real advice about buying cars. Do you want us to help you find a car? Submit your story on our form.)

Here is the scenario.

My wife and I live in Abu Dhabi and we bought a small house back in North Carolina where her mom lives which serves as our home base (although we've never lived in NC full-time, we're Philly folks). We are back about twice a year for at least a few weeks at a time but during all seasons. We often borrow or rent a car (usually a small crossover or wagon) when we're back in the States, but sorting that first thing when we arrive is a hassle and we want to get something cheap and reliable for the time we're back.

We'd like something that has a decent payload, decent power, not too high off the ground (so her 89 y.o. mom can get in), very reliable - we want it to just be there, not be a headache in any way, comfortable seats for long drives (bad back), AWD or 4WD for east coast winter road trips, and good highway performance.

Looking to spend about $25,000

Constantly lining up car rentals when you are back in town can be a hassle and expensive in the long run, so there is comfort in knowing that you have reliable transport ready. There is a solid selection of quality crossovers and compacts for around $25,000, but the tricky part is that you probably want a bit more punch than most of the four-cylinder motors are offering, since they tend to be optimized for maximum fuel economy.

However, there is one car that checks all of your boxes if you are willing to try what is a bit of an odd-duck. The Buick Regal TourX was GM's answer to the incredibly popular Subaru Outback, but in typical GM fashion, the automaker did a poor job of marketing the car and had a strange bundling of option packages. It was a really good wagon that is essentially a re-badged import from one of GM's international brands. Under the hood is a two-liter turbo-four that makes a respectable 250 hp. It's not a rocket ship, but that's plenty of punch for highway passing. The storage capacity is massive, making this wagon perfect for long road trips and of course, the seats are super comfy, as you would expect from a Buick. In terms of reliability, Buick models tend to hold up pretty well, and due to the GM parts bin service should be pretty easy.

The only real downside to these cars is that they can be a bit rare, especially in that mid-$20,000 price range, but I did manage to find one with about 50,000 miles not terribly far from you in Myrtle Beach.

I'm not going to lie, Jon. The Buick Regal TourX is a lot cooler than what I'm about to recommend. Normal people may not think a Buick station wagon is cool, but enthusiasts will love it if you show up in a Regal TourX. If you want something practical with enthusiast cred, that's the way to go. But do you really trust a Buick to sit for most of the year and then be dependable and reliable on an East Coast winter road trip?

If you do, more power to you. But I'd argue what you really want is a Toyota. But not a RAV4 or Highlander. Those are too obvious. Instead, I say get an all-wheel-drive Sienna. Yes, a minivan, even though you don't mention having kids. Siennas are road trip warriors that will eat up the miles comfortably and reliably, and even better, it's going to be super easy for your mother-in-law to get into the second row. If she ends up needing to travel with any medical equipment, you'll have plenty of room for it. If she ends up needing a wheelchair, you can easily just toss it in the back

It'll be useful for more than just road trips and carting around your MIL, too. If you show up in Charlotte for a visit and notice that something's broken while you were out of town, you'll be able to use your minivan like a truck to bring home that new washing machine, plywood, flooring or anything else your local Lowe's has that you need. Minivans are just that practical. Plus, it has a V6 that makes nearly 300 hp, which is more than you'll get in the Buick.

Since Toyota's made the Sienna for so long, you shouldn't have a problem finding one in your area for less than $25,000. Basically, just buy the nicest one that fits into your budget. One possible option among many is this 2020 Sienna that's been driven a lot over the past three years but should still have plenty of life left in it. It's also probably a lot newer than most of the other Siennas in your budget. But if that's too many miles for you to stomach in just a couple of years, I totally get that.

Jon, the first thing I thought of for you was the Ford Maverick. The little 'Mav checks most of your boxes, but the problem is going to be finding one within your budget. A new Ford Maverick ostensibly starts under $25,000, but good luck finding one without markups and other dealer shenanigans due to lower stock. In lieu of the Maverick, I'm going to recommend this CPO 2019 Honda Ridgeline, which comes in at just under your budget, though it's a bit far away.

The Honda Ridgeline is a truck for people who are more reasonable than susceptible to truck trends today. These people want reasonable towing capacity, reasonable payload capacity, reasonable performance, and reasonable fuel economy considering that the Ridgeline comes with a 3.5-liter V6.

All of this in a Honda, by the way, whose six-cylinder engines are reliable and beyond reproach. Not to mention, the Honda Ridgeline will be an extremely comfortable ride -- much more, at least, than other comparable trucks. Well, it may not be easy to compare, since the Ridgeline is unlike most other pickups. Detractors would say it's unlike most others in a negative way, but they would be wrong. The Ridgeline will make for a comfy, reasonable hauler on the highway and still make for a fantastic family car.

We Want A Worry-Free Car With A Balance Of Power And Payload! What Should We Buy?

China is taking bold actions and creating a new paradigm on the world stage. For about a decade, Beijing has been responsible for developing new trade networks; the famous Belt and Road Initiative has been analyzed extensively. Their trade networks are growing ever deeper, with new agreements to trade in renminbi as opposed to dollars.

China is developing powerful alternative institutions to those of the West, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). They have adopted a more confident and assertive security posture in response to the Biden administration's policies on Taiwan. However, new military measures have been far outweighed by fresh diplomatic overtures, with Beijing striking an impressive deal between Riyadh and Tehran -- which, for various reasons, Washington found impossible to secure in the four decades it designated the conflict as intractable.

Washington is mentioned because all these actions taken by Beijing add up to a serious challenge of Washington's hegemonic status. Washington is undoubtedly a hegemon; chief among the corps of evidence is a map of all its global military bases.

Figure 1: United States military bases abroad, 2015

This may change. For now, however, America has stationed troops all over the world, and the few territories where it can't do so (Russia, China, and Iran) are surrounded and unable to project power in the same way. This is the definition of hegemonic power. The actions taken on the world stage by Washington in recent years, when compared to actions it took in previous eras, also prove its current hegemonic status.

Recent interventions in Somalia and Iraq are very different from the conflicts of yesteryear, like the American Revolution or the Mexican War. The American Revolution was fought to secure independence from Britain -- the hegemon of the time -- and the Mexican War was fought to secure the land and interests of American settlers in the territory adjacent to the legal boundaries of the United States at that time. The conflicts were limited in scope, with specific, tangible goals in the interests of the American population.

The interventions in Somalia and Iraq were fought purely to secure hegemonic status for Washington through the imposition of military force and ideological subversion on far-flung places. These interventions carried no material or psychological benefit for the American population, and the justifications for intervention presented to them don't accord with reality.

Baghdad wasn't involved in 9/11, and it would have been far less costly to purchase Iraqi oil than to invade, destroy, and attempt to rebuild the country. It would also have been far less costly to simply send the American navy to protect commerce in the Gulf of Aden (and spread the cost with other interested parties like China), while disregarding the internal politics of barren and unproductive Somalia. Any humanitarian arguments falter against the objectively worse conditions created by US intervention. Like in Iraq, the attempt to bring the political formula of liberal democracy to Somalia was a thin cover for Washington's attempt to secure political submission from as many nations as possible.

Recent moves by Beijing will not obtain hegemonic status for itself but will take this status away from Washington and lead to a multipolar world order. Washington clearly considers recent developments to be a challenge to its hegemonic status, evidenced by its more aggressive military posture toward Taiwan. President Joe Biden has repeatedly stated that he would defend Taiwan militarily, the US Navy routinely sails through the Taiwan Strait, military aid to Taiwan has increased, and one could use polemic to say that Nancy Pelosi invaded the island last year. Beijing taking over Taiwan, peacefully or otherwise, would decisively remove Washington's hegemonic status. Washington desperately wishes to hold Taiwan and keep China surrounded.

Other evidence that Washington considers Beijing to be a severe threat to its hegemonic status can be found in the mainstream media throughout the North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries. There is a constant stream of emotionally provocative stories directed against alleged human rights violations by Beijing found not just in America but in the United Kingdom and other "allied" countries as well. Many of these stories are false or misleading and, where true, can hardly be assailed from the moral depths of using depleted uranium bullets against the populations of Iraq and Serbia (among other injustices). Clearly the Western ruling class wants the populations it governs to be hostile to Beijing -- as opposed to other less-than-perfect regimes -- because Beijing is a threat to their hegemonic status.

China's ascendancy challenges the real methods of exerting power over the world possessed by Washington. It deprives Washington of the benefits of hegemonic status in wealth, prestige, and military power.

A unipolar, or hegemonic, order has a very negative set of incentives. When one power is unmatched, it possesses total freedom of action without accountability. Regardless of the morality or wisdom of a course of action, the hegemon can enact said course and bring about disastrous consequences for itself and others.

There are no comparable powers to prevent this, and this dynamic only ends when the singular power loses its hegemonic status and a multipolar order develops. The loss of hegemonic status is usually a cataclysm, either domestically for the formerly hegemonic power or internationally in the form of a losing war waged to secure hegemonic status against its challengers.

Politics can be defined as the struggle for power, and only power can restrain power. It is corrupting for a single state to have unmatched power. Hegemony is injurious for peace and liberty even if it is frequently justified with the unrealistic claim that a unipolar world order can put an end to all wars.

However, a balance between competing powers tends toward better outcomes. Since no one power can dominate totally, it is in the interests of all major powers to agree to a set of neutral and objective rules establishing at least a degree of sovereignty and a framework for peace for all. Italian political scientist Gaetano Mosca referred to this as "juridical defense." Major powers also have to offer benefits to smaller countries to entice them into a sphere of influence, as there are competing powers that they could ally with. War and domination are unavoidable, but a multipolar world leads to more peace and freedom.

These concepts are proven by recent history. Washington has behaved remarkably poorly on the world stage since becoming a hegemon in the early nineties. It is weak internally and will lose its hegemony by internal collapse, a losing war launched against major challengers like Russia and China, or a combination of these factors. As a multipolar world emerges, Russia and China have made deals with other countries on favorable terms as they attempt to carry their support against the competing Washington pole. Vladimir Putin and Sergey Lavrov repeatedly and explicitly reference the multipolar concept as a normative goal.

There is a lot of confusion around the concept of a collapse. A total collapse never occurs as productive human action is a permanent phenomenon. However, something like a chaotic failed countercoup against a 2024 victory for Donald Trump and the subsequent creation of a completely different political system with a different foreign policy worldview would constitute an internal collapse for present Washington.

All of this relates to the ideas of James Burnham and the "Machiavellian" school of political science, as well as the "neorealist" school of international relations. Mosca and Burnham conceived of the "juridical defense" primarily from the standpoint of domestic politics. However, if anything, the theory applies better to the international arena. By definition, if there are multiple claims for sovereign power that cannot defeat each other, there are multiple political units. This is the situation internationally, but not domestically, where one sovereign prevails.

While an international balance of power may tend toward better outcomes, one should not get carried away with a purely process-based or systems-based analysis. Institutions are not people, institutions don't possess a personality, and they can't act for themselves.

The most determinative factor is the composition of the ruling class and their character as individuals and as a group, as well as their identity, subculture, worldview, material interests, and moral beliefs. Thus, even a hegemonic Beijing would be better than a hegemonic Washington, as the Chinese ruling class have demonstrated far less willingness to invade countries using maximum force or interfere in other countries' domestic culture and political affairs than have the current Western ruling class.

China's Maneuvering and the New Balance of Power - J.R. MacLeod

Incomers have absorbed some smaller players -- increasing competition for fees, talent and market share, finds Linda Daly

When the American college football giants Notre Dame and Navy touched down in Dublin for their season opener yesterday, watching in the stands of Aviva were a fair few lawyers. Irish partners from international law firms Clark Hill, DLA Piper, Dentons and Squire Patton Boggs were among those hosting their American colleagues for the game.

While the jury is still out on whether the arrival of 40,000 football fans is really "the biggest movement of Americans across the Atlantic since D-Day", there is no doubt that more US law firms have arrived on Ireland's shores over the past few years than ever. British and European heavyweights are also invading the market.

Industry commentators count about 30 international legal houses setting up shop in Ireland over

Influx of international law firms to Ireland tilts the balance of power

"Bloodied by costly interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, damaged by high levels of debt and sluggish growth, shattered by a crisis of confidence, Americans are not yearning for an omnipotent America."

It's been four decades since the resignation of Richard Nixon and two decades since his death, and he remains the "one president of whom it could never be said: 'Richard, we hardly knew ye.'" He was, as Charles Krauthammer once remarked, "the most thoroughly psychoanalyzed president -- perhaps public person -- of our time."

We all know Nixon, a man so driven by insecurities and hatreds that he abused his powers and resorted to dirty tricks and cover-ups. Yet he was also a man of high intelligence and shrewd instincts, whose foreign-policy judgments were widely respected at home and abroad. With Henry Kissinger, he opened relations with Communist China, he defused the Cold War by initiating détente and nuclear arms-control treaties with the Soviet Union, and he extricated the United States from Vietnam with minimum damage to its global standing.

It is also well known that Nixon, as president, was hardly the second coming of Woodrow Wilson. During his five-and-a-half-year tenure, he explicitly argued that the United States needed to recognize limits to power and he appealed to the classic conservative virtues of prudence, skepticism concerning sweeping ambition and the dangers of hubris.

What is less well known about Nixon, however, is that more than any other postwar president, including Jimmy Carter and Barack Obama, he recognized the perils of America's global predominance. At a time of deep doubts and widespread uncertainty about America's place in the emerging post-Vietnam world, it was Nixon who prepared his fellow citizens to adapt to decline in a more plural international environment and to adopt policies that would smooth the path to a new, more limited role in foreign affairs.

In July 1971, as Kissinger was secretly en route to Peking to complete plans for the presidential visit, Nixon predicted that that in fifteen years, America's global hegemony would be replaced by a multipolar world. Far from embracing the classic Cold War vision of a world divided between the satanic East and godly West, Nixon described the world in classic balance-of-power terms: divided into emerging power blocs of the United States, Soviet Union, Western Europe, China and Japan, none of which was predominant. In an underreported speech in Kansas City on July 6, he declared:

The United States no longer is in the position of complete pre-eminence or predominance [and] that is not a bad thing. As a matter of fact, it can be a constructive thing. . . . Now we face a situation where four other potential economic superpowers have the capacity, have the kind of people . . . who can challenge us on every front.

A man who, as late as 1966, had championed a Pax Americana had within half a decade acknowledged that the American Century was drawing to a close. Americans, he urged, had to learn to adapt themselves to their new status as only one power in a five-centered multipolar international system. Though premature, Nixon acknowledged what no president since has been willing to admit -- that we live in a pluralistic world and that U.S. power is past its apogee.

Nor were these remarks an isolated incident. Before he went to China in February 1972, he told Time magazine in language more reminiscent of Hans Morgenthau than Jack Kennedy: "I think it will be a safer world and a better world if we have a strong, healthy United States, Europe, Soviet Union, China, Japan, each balancing the other . . . an even balance."

The duo of Nixon and Kissinger, instead of using the prism of American exceptionalism to look at the post-Vietnam world, envisaged it as an emerging multipolar system to be structured and regulated by a balance of power a la the 1815 Congress of Vienna, which was the subject of the latter's doctoral dissertation. "It is when one nation becomes infinitely more powerful in relation to its potential competitor that the danger of war of arises." (Compare Nixon's rhetoric with that of Mitt Romney during the presidential campaign forty years later: "I will insist on a military so powerful no one would think of challenging it.")

At the time, Nixon's attempts to transform -- or "Europeanize" -- U.S. foreign policy were recognized by only a few figures, most notably Foreign Affairs editor James Chace, Paris-based scholar Edmund Stillman, Harvard professor Stanley Hoffman -- and one Walter Lippmann. The distinguished columnist had spent much of the postwar era attacking Nixon's red-baiting antics, but he had caught the significance of the new Nixon. As Lippmann told Ronald Steel in the Washington Post in March 1973:

[Nixon's] role has been that of a man who had to liquidate, defuse, deflate the exaggerations of the romantic period of American imperialism and American inflation. Inflation of promises, inflation of hopes, the Great Society, American supremacy -- all that had to be deflated because it was all beyond our power."

Reading the article in his White House daily briefing, Nixon noted in the margins: "Wise observation."

Nixon, a student of European history who greatly valued his relationships with Adenauer and de Gaulle, was no true believer in American exceptionalism. And his task of building a realpolitik world order was complicated by the fact that the historical experience of Europe bore little resemblance to how the American people had long viewed the world.

Deriving from the nation's history, Americans had accepted as a given their own idealistic sense of exceptionalism. Based on a distinction between the founding moral principles of America and the corruption of the Old World of Europe, exceptionalism had explained the global predominance of America in terms of its moral and material uniqueness.

Americans had come to believe that the United States had been deliberately founded as a nation unlike any other and had a mission to regenerate the world and international relations in its own image. Nixon's realism was ultimately incompatible with this culture. Not surprisingly, it met a backlash from both the left and the right.

Writing in Newsweek in 1970, liberal academic Eugene Genovese said: "Even those who speak for Realpolitik, including the most cynical and opportunist, have unwittingly contributed to the breakdown of an increasingly brittle and shoddy spiritual façade." And writing in National Review in 1973, conservative pundit Richard Whalen argued: "Neither Nixon nor Kissinger, for all their undoubted qualities of intellect, has a sure intuitive sense of this country, its people and their guiding sentiments."

Nixon's realism was not the language of his Cold War predecessors, nor was it the language of his successors, including Carter and Obama, who have articulated a vision of America rooted in the idea of American exceptionalism. For many Americans, as veteran columnist Richard Cohen has put it in another context, Nixon's realism was a dry, tasteless meal for the soul, no matter what its intellectual or practical virtues, and it sorely lacked Harry Truman's pledge "to support free peoples..." or Franklin Roosevelt's summons to a generation of Americans who had a "rendezvous with destiny." By surrendering the tradition of American exceptionalism, perhaps Nixon only made his failure at home more likely.

And yet Nixon's message resonates with today's Americans, who are tired of the world and suffering from foreign-policy fatigue. Just as the political climate changed dramatically in the late 1960s, so too today, Americans are urging a radical change in foreign-policy course. A majority of Americans, according to a Pew poll in late 2013, think the "US should mind its own business internationally." And only 30 percent of Americans, according to a Chicago Council of Global Affairs survey, would back military force in Ukraine if the Russians invaded the rest of the country.

Bloodied by costly interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, damaged by high levels of debt and sluggish growth, shattered by a crisis of confidence, Americans are not yearning for an omnipotent America. Nor are they seeking to "go abroad in search of monsters to destroy," which John Quincy Adams warned against. The only serious U.S. politician who appears to grasp these new realities is Senator Rand Paul. He would do well to look at his fellow Republican's foreign-policy legacy.

Nixon, the Balance of Power, and Realism

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China-Led BRICS to More Than Double with Admission of Six New Countries, Expansion Reflects a Shift in Balance of Power - Geller Report

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OSMAN: Is BRICS expansion a balance of power for Africa or a tug-of-war with the West?

Scenario planning in the Taiwan Strait that solely assumes a situation without natural disasters or emergencies, where the military and government function as usual, falls short in preparing for more complex contingencies.

We have to prepare for a "natural-artificial crisis", which refers to a scenario where a disaster or emergency is immediately followed by military action.

Recent natural disasters worldwide serve as a reminder that Taiwan faces considerable risks beyond the threat of armed invasion. In 2023, catastrophic seismic and climatic events occurred, such as a devastating magnitude 7.8 earthquake in Turkey and Syria, causing over 50,000 casualties. Cyclone Gabrielle impacted New Zealand, while Cyclones Judy and Kevin hit French territories in the South Pacific. Japan has already experienced six earthquakes of magnitude 5 or greater since the beginning of the year.

Unfortunately, the prevalence of natural disaster risks in the Indo-Pacific region is often overlooked, especially concerning the Taiwan contingency. We must consider what would happen if Taiwan or Japan were struck by one or more devastating natural disasters. Apart from the humanitarian crisis, such a situation could be manipulated by the People's Republic of China (PRC) as a strategic opportunity to change the status quo. Therefore, it is crucial, though unpleasant, to address such scenarios and risk preparedness.

Existential risk of a natural disaster around Taiwan

Taiwan has a historical record of being regularly hit by tropical cyclones, moderate earthquakes, and, though less frequently, tsunamis. In 2009, Typhoon Morakot made landfall in Taiwan and recorded more than 750 fatalities. While modern Taiwan has not faced catastrophic disasters, past challenges, like the Great Tsunami of Meiwa in 1771 and the Keelung earthquake of 1867, highlight the potential risks. According to one study, the recurrent cycle of this scale of earthquakes in this area is 150 to 400 years. Geologically, Taiwan's location between the Philippine Sea Plate and the Eurasian Plate makes it susceptible to destructive earthquakes at any time.

Natural-Artificial Crisis over Taiwan

Considering the possibility of significant natural disasters in Taiwan requires a comprehensive approach involving experts and policymakers from various fields. Military, diplomatic, political, economic, legal, and geological aspects must be examined to grasp the full scope of potential crises. This entails analyzing a scenario where natural and artificial crises converge, offering the PRC a chance to exploit vulnerabilities.

In such a scenario, the PRC might take military action against Taiwan, calculating that the U.S. and Japanese forces are unable to intervene promptly due to a disaster in the region. If the disaster hit Okinawa, a strategic linchpin for U.S. forward deployed forces, it is likely to hinder the ability of U.S. forces stationed in Okinawa, especially the Kadena Airbase and Expeditionary Marine Corps in Futenma or Henoko, as well as Japan's Self-Defense Forces (SDF) stationed in the south-western islands to act upon peace-time expectations. While additional military assets may be deployed from the mainland of Japan or Guam to preserve the balance of power, it is quite possible that the short time gap would be seen as the only window of opportunity for the People's Liberation Army to accomplish the unification of Taiwan.

Even if a disaster hit other parts of Japan, it still increases the already existing uncertainty of Japan's involvement in the Taiwan contingency. Given the remaining local sensitivities to the U.S. and Japanese militaries in Okinawa, the government of Japan must deal with a simple but esoteric question: can the Japanese SDF help Taiwan when its people need them? An adversary may think it possible to exploit the highly complicated decision-making of the Japanese government in a chaos.

Rising to the defense of Taiwan would be straightforward if Beijing opts for military options to invade. If Taiwan is attacked, it is likely that U.S. forces and its allies, especially Japan, would come to support Taiwan's self-defense. However, a natural disaster situation could lead to a non-military option by the PRC, subverting the Taiwanese state through other means. It would be harder for Taiwan and the rest of the world if Beijing were to choose a non-military option that nonetheless constitutes a form of subversion of the Taiwanese state, if not de-facto occupation.

To navigate this complex scenario, the PRC could apply its "three warfares"-psychological, public opinion, and legal warfare. By presenting humanitarian assistance as a domestic issue, announcing its position to rescue "compatriots in Taiwan", and sending humanitarian assistance forces, the PRC aims to win the hearts and minds of Taiwanese people and shape the international narrative in its favor. If there are casualties from the disaster in Taiwan, Beijing is likely to blame the Taiwanese government. If the U.S., Japan, and Europe are not able to provide Taiwan with rapid and efficient humanitarian aid, but Beijing can, it would be a massive discredit for Taiwan's partners, which Beijing would exploit.

Once such an event happens, this would be a tough game for those that neither recognize Taiwan as a sovereign state nor set up domestic legislation to justify their commitment. While it is crystal clear that the PRC has intentions to resolve "the Taiwan question" and to realize "China's complete reunification" as a historic mission and an unshakable commitment of the Chinese Communist Party, no country has the grounds to oppose peaceful means. It would be extremely difficult for external parties to keep the current line of refraining from recognizing Taiwan's sovereignty and committing to support Taiwan's autonomous democracy.

Necessary Preparations

Preparations are necessary and possible for such a natural-artificial crisis. Defensive parties should expand their imagination with a sense of realism and improve their preparedness for various potential risks caused by any contingency, including a natural disaster.

First, Beijing is more likely to take military actions in the context of a natural disaster if the courses of action by the U.S. and its allies for such a contingency are not prepared and promulgated in advance. In order to prevent Beijing from underestimating U.S. and Japanese deterrence, the list should include the military planning for securing maritime and aerial advantages in a disaster, the division of labor among U.S. and Japanese forces to on-site disaster relief in Okinawa or Taiwan, alternative logistical support, etc. Holding joint U.S.-Japan exercises for disaster relief around Okinawa will also effectively enhance and display their preparedness. They'd be well advised to integrate their situational awareness not only in a linear spectrum, from peacetime to wartime, but also integrating outliers such as a disaster as a means of upgrading their deterrence. As a large-scale disaster requires a regional response, inviting observers from South Korea, the Philippines, Australia, and Taiwan to these exercises can promote the actual relevance and responsiveness of the U.S. alliance system to disaster-related contingencies.

Additionally, some governments need to reform domestic legislation related to disaster relief, given that the key in this scenario is time and information constraints. For instance, Japan should reconsider the incumbent system of deployment of SDF to disaster relief to include requests lodged to the defense minister by mayors of a city, ward, or village, prefectural governors, and the head of the Japan Coast Guard. The current process takes too much time and involves unnecessary red tape during a natural-artificial crisis. Also, there are no explicit provisions enabling the SDF to transport non-nationals for humanitarian purposes. As Taiwan's closest neighbor, Japan needs to assume the worst and move quickly.

To prepare for Beijing's non-military scenario, diplomats of Taiwan's partners can seek agreements to creatively mitigate legitimacy risks. While providing weapons and political support to Taiwan is continuously essential, specific measures and legal grounds for actually saving Taiwanese lives in case of a natural disaster are often overlooked. As Japan and Taiwan have reached an official agreement on fisheries without addressing the sovereignty issue of Taiwan, a similar agreement that articulates mutual support at the time of a disaster between Taiwan and its partners would send a message to the world that Taiwan can receive support in time of need. Planning for a noncombatant evacuation operation among Taiwan and its partners is also an urgent matter not only for a military scenario, but for a natural disaster scenario as well.

Such measures would not antagonize the People's Republic of China. They are necessary for preventing anyone from miscalculating the situation and taking wrong actions which could lead to catastrophe in the region.

Balance of Power in the Taiwan Strait in the Case of a Natural Disaster: Considering an Overlooked Scenario

The rapid ascent of the BRICS nations -- Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa -- has intensified the dialogue around Africa's role in the new world order. Historically a playground for Western influence and resource extraction, Africa is in a defining moment. Will the continent forge a balanced path between Western nations and the BRICS bloc, or will it become a theatre for a new era of geopolitical tug-of-war? This article aims to delve into the complex dynamics shaping this narrative.

A historical assessment is vital to understand the geopolitical landscape of Africa. Since the late 19th century, the continent has been the target of European imperialism, significantly shaping its socio-political framework. Western countries, led by the United States and former colonial powers like France and the United Kingdom, have exerted considerable influence, often under the guise of foreign aid and development projects.

Contrary to the long-standing Western engagement models, the BRICS bloc offers a less paternalistic and more equitable framework for development. With significant investment in infrastructure, education, and technology, BRICS nations aim for a mutually beneficial relationship. South Africa's inclusion in the bloc provides an African voice within BRICS and a unique opportunity for the continent to align itself with a growth-oriented paradigm.

The emergence of the BRICS bloc poses a problem for Western countries. While their economic and diplomatic grip on Africa remains significant, the growth of BRICS threatens to alter the balance of power. Detractors point to "debt-trap diplomacy," particularly by China, to argue that the bloc's engagement may not be as generous as it appears.

The fear is that while BRICS nations may not openly dictate terms, they could subtly impose economic conditions detrimental to Africa's sovereignty. The continent now faces an unprecedented opportunity. On one hand, there are established ties with Western nations, fraught with history and familiarity. On the other hand, there is a new alliance with BRICS nations that promises economic growth without explicit political strings attached.

Africa is not a monolith. The continent's diverse economies require tailored approaches, from resource-rich nations like Nigeria and Angola to burgeoning tech hubs like Kenya and Rwanda. The BRICS bloc offers diversification, but the challenge lies in discerning which partnerships best suit the developmental needs of specific African nations.

The expansion of the BRICS economic bloc offers African countries leverage to negotiate better deals with both BRICS nations and Western countries. However, there's a caveat -- Africa must avoid becoming a pawn in the geopolitical ambitions of these competing powers. Strategic partnerships must be forged cautiously, prioritizing national interests and long-term gains.

On the other hand, the surprise expansion of the bloc and the admission of six new members, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Ethiopia, Egypt, Argentina, and the United Arab Emirates, could have far-reaching implications, both geopolitically and economically. One of the most striking questions arising from this expansion is whether the BRICS mechanism can serve as a platform for economic diplomacy to resolve long-standing conflicts among its new members, such as the Nile River dispute between Egypt and Ethiopia.

Given the bloc's focus on mutual economic growth and investment, BRICS can promote collaborative solutions that benefit both nations. This situation could serve as a litmus test for the bloc's ability to foster economic diplomacy among its members.

China's role in mediating between Saudi Arabia and Iran provides valuable insights into how BRICS might approach conflict resolution. Long-standing tensions between Riyadh and Tehran have thawed somewhat, thanks to China's efforts driven by a mix of strategic outlook and economic interest.

In conclusion, with this addition, Africa and its new BRICS partners have an unprecedented chance to redefine their futures. It's a precarious but promising balance that requires astute diplomatic maneuvering. As the stakes get higher, so does the potential for transformative change within Africa and the broader international community.

Dr Mohamed Osman Mohamoud, PhD, is the National Economic Advisor to the President of Somalia. He is also a Member of the National Economic Council and serves as a Regional Representative for the United Nations University for Peace. In addition to his roles in government and international organizations, Dr Mohamoud is the Founder and CEO of the Sadar Institute. You can follow the author on twitter @MohamedOsmanSom

In the Age of BRICS Expansion, Africa and the West: A Balance of Power or a Tug-of-War?

NAIROBI, Kenya, Sep 1 - The rapid ascent of the BRICS nations -- Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa -- has intensified the dialogue around Africa's role in the new world order.

Historically a playground for Western influence and resource extraction, Africa is in a defining moment. Will the continent forge a balanced path between Western nations and the BRICS bloc, or will it become a theatre for a new era of geopolitical tug-of-war? This article aims to delve into the complex dynamics shaping this narrative.

A historical assessment is vital to understand the geopolitical landscape of Africa. Since the late 19th century, the continent has been the target of European imperialism, significantly shaping its socio-political framework. Western countries, led by the United States and former colonial powers like France and the United Kingdom, have exerted considerable influence, often under the guise of foreign aid and development projects.

Contrary to the long-standing Western engagement models, the BRICS bloc offers a less paternalistic and more equitable framework for development. With significant investment in infrastructure, education, and technology, BRICS nations aim for a mutually beneficial relationship. South Africa's inclusion in the bloc provides an African voice within BRICS and a unique opportunity for the continent to align itself with a growth-oriented paradigm.

The emergence of the BRICS bloc poses a problem for Western countries. While their economic and diplomatic grip on Africa remains significant, the growth of BRICS threatens to alter the balance of power. Detractors point to "debt-trap diplomacy," particularly by China, to argue that the bloc's engagement may not be as generous as it appears.

The fear is that while BRICS nations may not openly dictate terms, they could subtly impose economic conditions detrimental to Africa's sovereignty. The continent now faces an unprecedented opportunity. On one hand, there are established ties with Western nations, fraught with history and familiarity. On the other hand, there is a new alliance with BRICS nations that promises economic growth without explicit political strings attached.

Africa is not a monolith. The continent's diverse economies require tailored approaches, from resource-rich nations like Nigeria and Angola to burgeoning tech hubs like Kenya and Rwanda. The BRICS bloc offers diversification, but the challenge lies in discerning which partnerships best suit the developmental needs of specific African nations.

The expansion of the BRICS economic bloc offers African countries leverage to negotiate better deals with both BRICS nations and Western countries. However, there's a caveat -- Africa must avoid becoming a pawn in the geopolitical ambitions of these competing powers. Strategic partnerships must be forged cautiously, prioritizing national interests and long-term gains.

On the other hand, the surprise expansion of the bloc and the admission of six new members, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Ethiopia, Egypt, Argentina, and the United Arab Emirates, could have far-reaching implications, both geopolitically and economically. One of the most striking questions arising from this expansion is whether the BRICS mechanism can serve as a platform for economic diplomacy to resolve long-standing conflicts among its new members, such as the Nile River dispute between Egypt and Ethiopia.

Given the bloc's focus on mutual economic growth and investment, BRICS can promote collaborative solutions that benefit both nations. This situation could serve as a litmus test for the bloc's ability to foster economic diplomacy among its members.

China's role in mediating between Saudi Arabia and Iran provides valuable insights into how BRICS might approach conflict resolution. Long-standing tensions between Riyadh and Tehran have thawed somewhat, thanks to China's efforts driven by a mix of strategic outlook and economic interest.

In conclusion, with this addition, Africa and its new BRICS partners have an unprecedented chance to redefine their futures. It's a precarious but promising balance that requires astute diplomatic maneuvering. As the stakes get higher, so does the potential for transformative change within Africa and the broader international community.

Africa must avoid becoming a pawn in the geopolitical ambitions of these competing powers.

The rapid ascent of the BRICS nations-Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa-has intensified the dialogue around Africa's role in the new world order. Historically a playground for Western influence and resource extraction, Africa is in a defining moment. Will the continent forge a balanced path between Western nations and the BRICS bloc, or will it become a theatre for a new era of geopolitical tug-of-war? This article aims to delve into the complex dynamics shaping this narrative.

A historical assessment is vital to understand the geopolitical landscape of Africa. Since the late 19th century, the continent has been the target of European imperialism, significantly shaping its socio-political framework. Western countries, led by the United States and former colonial powers like France and the United Kingdom, have exerted considerable influence, often under the guise of foreign aid and development projects.

Contrary to the long-standing Western engagement models, the BRICS bloc offers a less paternalistic and more equitable framework for development. With significant investment in infrastructure, education, and technology, BRICS nations aim for a mutually beneficial relationship. South Africa's inclusion in the bloc provides an African voice within BRICS and a unique opportunity for the continent to align itself with a growth-oriented paradigm.

The emergence of the BRICS bloc poses a problem for Western countries. While their economic and diplomatic grip on Africa remains significant, the growth of BRICS threatens to alter the balance of power. Detractors point to 'debt-trap diplomacy,' particularly by China, to argue that the bloc's engagement may not be as generous as it appears.

The fear is that while BRICS nations may not openly dictate terms, they could subtly impose economic conditions detrimental to Africa's sovereignty. The continent now faces an unprecedented opportunity. On one hand, there are established ties with Western nations, fraught with history and familiarity. On the other hand, there is a new alliance with BRICS nations that promises economic growth without explicit political strings attached.

Africa is not a monolith. The continent's diverse economies require tailored approaches, from resource-rich nations like Nigeria and Angola to burgeoning tech hubs like Kenya and Rwanda. The BRICS bloc offers diversification, but the challenge lies in discerning which partnerships best suit the developmental needs of specific African nations.

The expansion of the BRICS economic bloc offers African countries leverage to negotiate better deals with both BRICS nations and Western countries. However, there's a caveat-Africa must avoid becoming a pawn in the geopolitical ambitions of these competing powers. Strategic partnerships must be forged cautiously, prioritizing national interests and long-term gains.

On the other hand, the surprise expansion of the bloc and the admission of six new members, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Ethiopia, Egypt, Argentina, and the United Arab Emirates, could have far-reaching implications, both geopolitically and economically. One of the most striking questions arising from this expansion is whether the BRICS mechanism can serve as a platform for economic diplomacy to resolve long-standing conflicts among its new members, such as the Nile River dispute between Egypt and Ethiopia.

Given the bloc's focus on mutual economic growth and investment, BRICS can promote collaborative solutions that benefit both nations. This situation could serve as a litmus test for the bloc's ability to foster economic diplomacy among its members.

China's role in mediating between Saudi Arabia and Iran provides valuable insights into how BRICS might approach conflict resolution. Long-standing tensions between Riyadh and Tehran have thawed somewhat, thanks to China's efforts driven by a mix of strategic outlook and economic interest.

In conclusion, with this addition, Africa and its new BRICS partners have an unprecedented chance to redefine their futures. It's a precarious but promising balance that requires astute diplomatic maneuvering. As the stakes get higher, so does the potential for transformative change within Africa and the broader international community.

Dr Mohamed Osman Mohamoud, PhD, is the National Economic Advisor to the President of Somalia. He is also a Member of the National Economic Council and serves as a Regional Representative for the United Nations University for Peace. In addition to his roles in government and international organizations, Dr Mohamoud is the Founder and CEO of the Sadar Institute. You can follow the author on twitter @MohamedOsmanSom

Opinion: In the Age of BRICS Expansion, Africa and the West: A Balance of Power or a Tug-of-War? - Africa Newswire

BSP wants to hold cabinet portfolios by formally joining the government.

After announcing that the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) will not be joining any of the two major alliances (INDIA and NDA), the party chief Mayawati hinted at the possibility of forming a post-poll alliance with either of the two blocs.

Following a meeting with senior party leaders in New Delhi, Mayawati stated on Tuesday (25 July) that the decision to join a government would be made after the upcoming Assembly elections in Rajasthan, Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, and Telangana.

BSP's primary focus would be to ensure a "balance of power" and uplift the marginalized, Dalits, and backward sections of society, she said.

Mayawati emphasized the importance of a coalition government committed to the welfare of the people, rather than a strong and arrogant government. She expressed her willingness to work with a coalition that prioritizes the welfare of minorities and marginalized sections.

In a previous statement, Mayawati had mentioned that her party would contest the upcoming Assembly elections independently and not form an alliance with any other party.

The BSP leader pointed out that the party had previously emerged as a "balance of power" in several states but accused "anti-BSP and casteist elements" of using various tactics to break away party MLAs for their pursuit of power, which had affected the BSP movement.

The upcoming Assembly elections in Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, and Telangana are crucial as they may determine the course of potential alliances in the future.

The BJP and Congress are the dominant players in three of these states, while Telangana may witness a three-cornered contest involving the BRS, BJP, and Congress.

The recent statement by the BSP indicates its willingness to become a part of either the Congress or the BJP-led governments in these states in the future, paving the way for the 2024 Lok Sabha polls.

In the 2018 Assembly elections, the BSP secured six seats in Rajasthan and two each in Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh. After the elections, the BSP extended support to the Congress in Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh to keep the BJP out of power.

However, the BSP MLAs switched sides to join the Congress for personal gains, a BSP leader said. The BSP leader believes that if the party formally joins the government and its MLAs become ministers, they are less likely to leave the party, which would help strengthen the party's base and support the deprived sections.

When asked about the possibility of joining either the NDA or INDIA, the BSP leader clarified that the party is not focusing on any particular party. Instead, they will decide on joining the government based on their position as a "balance of power" after the elections.

Coalition Needed For Balance Of Power: Mayawati Open To Post-Poll Alliance As BSP Decides To Contest Elections Alone

By Joseph S. Nye, Jr.

CAMBRIDGE -- When Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi met with U.S. President Joe Biden in the White House last month, many observers saw the makings of an evolving alliance against China. But such expectations are overwrought. As Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar has made clear, a formal alliance is not in the cards, even if it is still possible to maintain long-term partnerships in a multipolar world of "frenemies."

India has a long history of post-colonial mistrust of alliances. But it has also long been preoccupied with China, at least since the Himalayas border war the two countries fought in 1962. While serving in President Jimmy Carter's administration, I was sent to India to encourage Prime Minister Morarji Desai to support a South Asian nuclear-weapons-free zone, lest the burgeoning nuclear race between India and Pakistan get out of hand. As my Indian hosts told me at the time, they wanted to be compared not to Pakistan in South Asia, but to China in East Asia.

After the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, the United States and India began 20 years of annual "Track Two" talks between former diplomats who were still in close contact with those in government. (The American delegation, for example, included figures such as Henry Kissinger and Richard Holbrooke.) The Indian participants shared their U.S. counterparts' concerns about al-Qaeda and other extremist threats in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but they also made clear that they objected to the Americans' tendency to think about India and Pakistan as "linked by a hyphen."

The Indians were also concerned about China, but they wanted to maintain the appearance of good relations -- and access to the Chinese market. China has long been one of India's largest trading partners, but its economy has grown much more rapidly than India's. Using market exchange rates, China represented 3.6 percent of world GDP by the turn of this century, but India did not reach that level until the 2020s.

In the 2000s, as China's growth far outpaced theirs, the Indians in the Track Two talks worried not just about China's support for Pakistan, but also about its increasing global power more broadly. As one Indian strategist put it, "We have decided we dislike you less than we dislike China" -- and this was long before the 2020 skirmish on the disputed Himalayan border, where 20 Indian soldiers were killed.

The India-U.S. alignment has since strengthened considerably. A decade ago, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue ("Quad") meetings between U.S., Indian, Japanese, and Australian diplomats were downplayed; now, they are loudly publicized and held at the head-of-government level. India today holds more joint military exercises with the U.S. than with any other country.

But this arrangement is a far cry from an alliance. India still imports over half its arms from Russia, is a major buyer of sanctioned Russian oil (alongside China), and frequently votes against the U.S. at the United Nations. Indeed, India has still refused to condemn Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine, just as it failed to condemn the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. For all of India's self-congratulation as the world's largest democracy, it has not come to the defense of democratic Ukraine. Its top priorities are to maintain its access to arms and oil, and to avoid pushing Russia further into China's arms.

Though Biden has invited Modi to both of his Summits for Democracy, there is no shortage of Western and Indian critics who have decried Modi's illiberal turn toward Hindu nationalism. Recent statements about the two largest democracies' "shared values" may sound nice, but they, too, do not make an alliance. The key to Indo-U.S. relations is the balance of power with China, and India's place in it.

In this respect, India's importance is growing. Earlier this year, it surpassed China as the world's most populous country. As its population has grown to 1.4 billion, China has been experiencing demographic decline, with a labor force that peaked. Moreover, India's economy is on track to expand by 6 percent this year -- faster than China's -- making it the world's fifth-largest economy. If it continues at this rate, it could be the same size as the eurozone economy by mid-century.

With a huge population, nuclear weapons, a large army, a growing labor force, strong elite education, a culture of entrepreneurialism, and links to a large and influential diaspora, India will remain a significant factor in the global balance of power. But one should not get carried away. India alone cannot balance China, which got a big head start in its development.

China's economy remains about five times larger, and poverty is still widespread in India. Of India's 900 million working-age people, only around half are in the labor force, and more than one-third of females are illiterate. For India's growing population to be an economic asset, rather than a potential liability, it will have to be trained. Though China's labor force has peaked, it rests on a higher average level of education.

Despite the selective decoupling of trade in key strategic sectors, India still does not want to forego access to the Chinese market. While it participates in the Quad, it also participates in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the periodic meetings of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). Although it no longer speaks of non-alignment, nor is it interested in restrictive alliances. Following the basic logic of balance-of-power politics, India and the U.S. seem fated not for marriage but for a long-term partnership -- one that might last only as long as both countries remain concerned about China.

Joseph S. Nye, Jr., a professor at Harvard University and a former U.S. assistant secretary of defense, is the author, most recently, of "Do Morals Matter? Presidents and Foreign Policy from FDR to Trump" (Oxford University Press, 2019). This article was distributed by Project Syndicate (www.project-syndicate.org).

India and the global balance of power 

Running back D'angelo Durham is McNeese State's leading returning rusher despite being limited to four games last season. (American Press)

Not often can a team lose its top running back, the league's offensive player of the year, and believe it is better at that position heading into the next season.

Yet that is the case at McNeese State.

Gone is Deonta McMahon, who simply put: was the Cowboys offense last season. McMahon ran for 1,408 yards and 12 touchdowns last season in an offense that otherwise struggled mightily

This year though the Cowboys look deeper at running back with new weapons and the return of an old one.

"We have a really good group of running backs that have a lot of different skills," head coach Gary Goff said. "Running back is our deepest area. I like the talent we have back there."

Redshirt junior D'angelo Durham should lead the way. In four games last year Durham ran for 340 yards on 35 carries, a whopping average of 9.7 a rush. He also scored three touchdowns.

However, the 6-foot-1, 208-pound back was hurt in the season's fourth game and almost lost his leg after rushing for 148 yards on 14 carries against Mississippi College. After a long recovery, he is back to full speed if not faster.

"I feel great," D'angelo said. "I'm 100 percent and ready to go."

D'angelo has returned as a new player, showing leadership skills and a determined attitude.

"Nobody has worked harder than this guy," Goff said pointing to his running back. "He has put in tremendous effort and has become a real leader of this program. It has been great to see."

Durham, who as a freshman at Savanah State ran for more than 1,000 yards, says the time off helped.

"I take nothing for granted," Durham said. "I learned a lot watching last year. I could see the game differently."

Durham will not have to do it alone. Junior Josh Parker returns after a solid offseason to provide speed in the backfield.

Parker ran for 175 yards on 42 carries last season but showed big-play capability during the spring scrimmage. He could become a weapon in the passing game out of the backfield as a matchup problem as well.

Two additions to the roster from the junior college ranks should also help. Colby Hamm (5-10, 217) joins the Cowboys from Tyler Community College in Texas after spending his first year at the Air Force Academy.

Hamm, who Goff called "freakishly strong," ran for 101 yards on 30 carries last year at Tyler. He should provide a big back to the McNeese game.

Cam Thomas (5-8, 170) joins the Cowboys from Mississippi Gulf Coast Community College. In 22 games for the Bulldogs, Thomas averaged 5 yards a carry, gaining 1,601 yards on 321 tries.

Thomas finished with 13 touchdowns but did fumble eight times, losing three of them. He showed big-play ability ripping off a 99-yard scoring run last fall.

"I think this group has the ability to make some big plays for us," Goff said. "This is a room that is big for us this year."

Playing behind a rebuilt and beefed-up offensive line should help.

"Those guys are big," Durham said of his O-linemen. "I'm excited to see them play."

Goff, who admittedly loves to throw the football first, second and third, turned to the running game last year and may do it again this fall.

"I want to score points and will take them any way we can get them," Goff said. "If that means running the football we will run it."

Last season McNeese led the Southland Conference in rushing at just over 200 yards per game. While Goff said he would like more balance this season, he isn't about to give up on a good thing.

And if the running backs stay healthy, the Cowboys might be able to run their way back into the Football Championship Subdivision playoff hunt.

Balance of power: Running game must complement passing attack - American Press

Aerial view of Torne River Railway Bridge connecting Sweden and Finland in Haparanda, Sweden. -- Reuters

HIGH above a railway bridge spanning a foaming river just outside the Arctic Circle, Finnish construction workers hammer away at a project that will smooth the connections from Nato's Atlantic coastline in Norway to its new border with Russia.

"We will be removing some 1,200 of these one by one," says site manager Mika Hakkarainen, holding up a rivet.

Until February 2022, the €37mil (RM187.9mil) electrification of this short stretch of rail - the only rail link between Sweden and Finland - simply promised locals a chance to catch a night train down to the bright lights of Stockholm.

After Russia invaded Ukraine, that changed. Now Finland is part of Nato, and Sweden will be joining soon.

As the alliance reshapes its strategy in response to Russia's campaign, access to these new territories and their infrastructure opens ways for allies to watch and contain Moscow, and an unprecedented chance to treat the whole of northwest Europe as one bloc, nearly two dozen diplomats and military and security experts told Reuters.

The Finnish rail improvements around Tornio on the Swedish border are one example. Due for completion next year, they will make it easier for allies to send reinforcements and equipment from across the Atlantic to Kemijarvi, an hour's drive from the Russian border and seven hours from Russia's nuclear bastion and military bases near Murmansk in the Kola peninsula.

Among forces based there, Russia's Northern Fleet includes 27 submarines, more than 40 warships, around 80 fighter planes and stocks of nuclear warheads and missiles, data collected by the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA) shows.

In a military conflict with Nato, the fleet's main task would be to secure control of the Barents Sea and stop ships bringing reinforcements from North America to Europe through the waters between Greenland, Iceland and the UK.

That's something Finland can help Nato resist.

"It's all about containing those kinds of capabilities from the north," said retired US Major-General Gordon Davis Jr.

Construction workers on a bridge over Raumo river in Tornio, Finland. -- Reuters

Besides opening its territory, Helsinki is buying the right assets, particularly fighter jets, "to add value to (the) northeastern defence and, frankly, in a conflict put Russia at risk," he said.

Sweden's contribution will, by 2028, include a new generation of submarines in the Baltic Sea that Fredrik Linden, commander of Sweden's First Submarine Flotilla, says will make a big difference in protecting vulnerable seabed infrastructure and preserving access - currently major security headaches, as the September 2022 destruction of the Nord Stream gas pipelines showed.

"With five submarines we can close the Baltic Sea," said Linden. "We will cover the parts that are interesting with our sensors and with our weapons."

Analysts say the change is not before time. Russia has been actively developing its military and hybrid capabilities in the Arctic against the West, partly under the cover of international environmental and economic cooperation, the FIIA's deputy director Samu Paukkunen said.

Russia's defence ministry did not respond to a request for comment.

Paukkunen's institute estimates Western armed forces are militarily about 10 years behind Russia in the Arctic.

Even with the losses that Russia has sustained in Ukraine, the naval component of the Northern Fleet and the strategic bombers remain intact, Paukkunen said.

Nato member Denmark phased out its submarine fleet in 2004, part of a move to scale back its military capabilities after the end of the Cold War, and it has yet to decide on future investments. Norway is also ordering four new submarines, with delivery of the first due in 2029.

"It seems to me that we have some catching up to do, because we haven't done it properly for the last 25 years," said Sebastian Bruns, a senior researcher into maritime security at Kiel University's Institute for Security Policy.

Both developments show how the expanded alliance will reshape Europe's security map. The region from the Baltic in the south to the high north may become almost an integrated operating area for Nato.

"For Nato it's quite important to have now the whole northern part, to see it as a whole piece," said Lt-Col Michael Maus from Nato's Allied Command Transformation. He chaired the working group which led Finland's military integration into Nato.

"With (existing) Nato nations Norway and Denmark, now we have a whole bloc. And thinking about potential defence plans, it's for us a huge step forward, to consider it as a whole area now."

This became clear in May, when Finland hosted its first Arctic military exercise as a Nato member at one of Europe's largest artillery training grounds 25km above the Arctic Circle.

The nearby town of Rovaniemi, known to tourists as the home of Santa Claus, is also the base of Finland's Arctic air force and would serve as a military hub for the region in case of a conflict. Finland is investing some €150mil (RM761.8mil) to renew the base to be able to host half a new fleet of 64 F-35 fighter jets, due to arrive from 2026.

For the May manoeuvres, nearly 1,000 allied forces from the United States, Britain, Norway and Sweden filled the sparse motorways as they joined some 6,500 Finnish troops and 1,000 vehicles.

Capt Kurt Rossi, field artillery officer of the US Army, led a battery bringing in an M270 multiple rocket launcher.

It was first shipped from Germany across the Baltic Sea, then trucked nearly 900km to the north.

"We haven't been this close (to Russia) and been able to train up in Finland before," Rossi said.

If there was a conflict with Russia in the Baltic Sea area - where Russia has significant military capabilities at St Petersburg and Kaliningrad - the shipping lane Nato used for that exercise would be vulnerable. Finland relies heavily on maritime freight for all its supplies - customs data shows almost 96% of its foreign trade is carried across the Baltic.

The east-west railway link across the high north will open up an alternative, which could prove crucial.

"I think the Russians can quite easily interrupt the cargo transportation by sea so basically this northern route is the only accessible route after that," said Tuomo Lamberg, manager for cross border operations at Sweco, the Swedish company designing the electrification.

But that risk, too, may recede when Sweden joins Nato.

Down beneath the Baltic Sea waterline, the submarine commander Linden shows a reporter the captain's quarters of the Gotland, one of four submarines currently in Sweden's fleet, which will bring Nato's total in the Baltic countries to 12 by 2028.

The Gotlands, like Germany's modern Type 212 submarines, will be among Nato's most advanced non-nuclear submarines and can stay at sea for significantly longer than most other conventional models, the researcher Bruns said.

Sweden's submarines will add to Nato's listening powers. By 2028, Sweden will take delivery of a new design of vessel, called A26, he added. -- Reuters

A shift inthe Baltic balance of power

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The stereotypical Indian scene of traffic jammed around cows on the road? It's a thing of the past, according to Pushkar Misra, a senior executive with the giant Hinduja conglomerate: "India has really rapidly transformed into one of the world's most vibrant economies."

You are more likely to see the new made-in-India Mercedes-Benz EQS electric luxury sedan. Like the made-in-India Apple iPhone 14, it's evidence of the country's emergence as a sophisticated part of global manufacturing supply chains. Many of the sacred cows that long blocked India's economic emergence have been slaughtered.

"Now, online payments are so widely accepted that even the street hawker will not ask for cash. You can buy fish from a woman sitting on the side of the road and pay electronically," Misra says of the Modi government's digital democratisation that has seen half a billion people brought into the formal economy in the last decade.

India's physical infrastructure boom is impressive enough, with more than a trillion US dollars of investment planned to expand its highway and railway systems, including fast train lines built by Japanese firms. But its digital infrastructure expansion, while less visible, has been stunning in empowering its marginalised millions.

An economic miracle is shifting the global balance of power

Muhammad Ali Siddiqui is a writer who contributes to leading periodicals

It is not difficult to concede that the balance of power occupies a central position in the contemporary study of international relations because the concept lies at the heart of the traditional interpretation of keeping a semblance of harmony within the anarchic international system.

This concept emerged out of the long-drawn theoretical debate about importance of realism while managing relations between states and its opposition by precepts of neo-realism that brought in additional rational characteristics that also underpin international relations. Though both conceptual interpretations hold considerable influence in the prevailing system yet their use has come under continuous criticism.

What has emerged is that either realism or the balance of power has ever occupied a hegemonic position in the field. Instead, it is more appropriate to see them as occupying the central ground but at the same time being engaged in a constant debate with critics coming at them from a number of very different directions.

In this context it is pointed out that the progenitors of balance of power concept was based upon the European geopolitical experiences and they could at best view it with respect of both its adversarial and its associational dimensions. Despite their advocacy of the system they were keenly aware that in an international context, the balance of power could work at best only imperfectly. They considered the golden age for the balance of power was the era of dynastic international politics in the 18th century when states were governed by an international aristocracy that formed a distinctive international society. Under these circumstances, it was possible to achieve a just equilibrium by means of largely consensual and Europe-wide peace agreements.

But even when these agreements broke down, it was argued that the uncertainties associated with any attempt to calculate the prevailing balance of power generated restraint on the part of the rival dynasties and encouraged them to operate on the basis of the established dynastic rules of the game. However the emerging realities were indicating that the world had moved a very long way from these conditions. In the aftermath of World War II, what was seen were two ideologically driven behemoths operating in the absence of any international society.

The United States and the Soviet Union were restrained only by the crudest kind of balance of power and it was feared for the future of the world. In the changed circumstances it was mentioned that only if the two sides adopted the tools of classical diplomacy was there any hope that human race would survive.

The advocates of neo-realism approached the balance of power from a very different direction that was based upon the context of a detente that marked a period of relaxation in the Cold War tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. Their aim was to define the process of international politics through transcending historical difference and help reveal the essential differences between domestic and international politics and explain why the structure of the international system has proved so enduring. In the first instance, it was pointed out that all political systems can be categorised under one of two headings: hierarchy or anarchy. In a hierarchical political system, actors functionally differentiated and power is distributed on a vertical plane so that actors can exercise power over subordinate actors in the hierarchy but will themselves be subject to the power of actors that occupy a superior position in the hierarchy. Having made the distinction, however, the focus of attention was almost exclusively on anarchic political systems where actors are seen to operate on a horizontal plane.

It was elaborated that these actors do not consider that they are operating in a hierarchy or in a functionally differentiated system. They view themselves as independent and autonomous actors operating on the basis of self-help and so they are primarily concerned with maintaining their independence and autonomy.

To be able to do this, they must, from the start, establish how power is structured in the system. This requires them to identify the dominant actors in the system -- those actors that possess a disproportionate amount of the overall power in the system.

The issue moved actually towards defining the issue in terms of clearly distinguishable bipolar and multipolar systems. It was pointed out that, contrary to realists, it was shown that multipolar systems are prone to generate an unstable balance of power, whereas bipolar systems are prone to generate a stable balance of power. In multipolar systems if the balance of power begins to move against any of the dominant states in such a system, they will be pushed to respond by either internal or external balancing. Internal balancing requires the actor to enhance its power position by domestic means.

Along with it was also acknowledged that in a self-help or anarchic political system, there will be a tendency for any action that gives an actor a potential or future power advantage to be emulated by the other dominant actors in the system. As a consequence, in anarchy there will be a tendency for actors to take the form of like units. In other words, states can form alliances with each other to enhance their security but neo-realists mention that alliances are an inherently unstable feature of any anarchic system.

The problems of a multi-polar system reveal that its alliances generate the fear of entrapment, as the result of being drawn by an ally into an unnecessary or dangerous conflict and on the other hand, there is also the fear of abandonment.

The problem persists even in the face of a rising hegemon when, rather than forming an overwhelming alliance, states will often choose to pass the buck and, at least in the first instance, leave it to other states to confront the hegemon. Because of these sorts of uncertainties, it becomes extraordinarily difficult in an anarchic system to identify the nature of the balance of power at any point in time. Nevertheless, despite these uncertainties, it is mentioned that there is sufficient flexibility in the system to ensure that any potential hegemonic state will eventually be met by an effective counterbalancing alliance. But, by the same token it is much easier to identify the state of the balance of power in a bipolar system. As a consequence, not only are there fewer sources of instability but it is also easier for the two dominant states to reach mutual agreement and thereby to move from an adversarial balance of power through to an associational balance of power.

Nevertheless, insistent realists are of the view that dominant states aim to maximise their power position and their resort to defensive realism because of the assumption that dominant states only aim to preserve their independence. It is however observed that anarchic systems transform into hierarchical or at least unipolar systems on a very regular basis.

More pressing issue however was the persistence of uni-polarity in the post- Cold War world. It was mentioned that after the demise of the Soviet Union that uni-polarity is a very unstable structure and that it would rapidly give way to multi-polarity. At the outset it appears that in uni-polarity has proved stable comparatively yet the balance of power concept has shown that it is still evolving.

Evolution Of The Balance Of Power System

On July 26, 2023, the presidential guard of the Republic of Niger detained President Mohamed Bazoum. The army did not take the insurgents' side at first, taking a guarded position instead at the strategically important facilities in Niamey, Niger's capital city, with cautious calls to avoid violence. On the night of July 26, Niger's Air Force Colonel Amadu Abdraman spoke on television. In a statement on behalf of the putschists he announced the deposition of President Bazoum and establishment of the National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland (Conseil National pour la Sauvegarde de la Patrie). He cited the "deteriorating security situation" and "poor governance" as the main reasons for the coup.

On July 27, a statement was posted on Twitter (rebranded as 'X') by the unofficial account of the Nigerien armed forces (Forces Armées Nigériennes), that mostly publishes news reports on military operations. The statement, signed by the army chief of staff, Gen. Abdou Sidikou Issa, declared support for the "Defense and Security Forces," as the putschists called themselves in the televised address. On the morning of July 28, it transpired that Abdourahamane Tchiani, commander of the presidential guard, had been made head of Niger's National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland.

Burkina Faso, Guinea and Mali voiced support for the new government. However, the coup d'etat was condemned by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the African Union, the UN (including the security council), France, the USA and Russia. China chose not to make any declarations. ECOWAS, however, used very harsh rhetoric. At an extraordinary summit it held on July 30, ECOWAS demanded that the deposed President Bazoum be reinstated. If this failed to happen within a week, the organization threatened to "take all measures necessary to restore constitutional order in the Republic of Niger."

ECOWAS also closed the borders between its member states and Niger. Given that the ECOWAS memberships of Mali and Burkina Faso have already been suspended, the decision effectively closes Niger's borders with two countries - Benin and Nigeria. This limitation may be strongly felt, since Niger has been using the Niamey-Cotonou (Benin) transport corridor to export uranium concentrates and import foodstuffs and energy. However, a large part of interstate trade is traditionally made up of contraband, and not all the contraband trading routes, by far, cross the borders at official checkpoints. This will probably mitigate the real effect of sanctions upon Niger.

ECOWAS also instituted a no-fly zone for all commercial flights to and from Niger, suspended all transactions between ECOWAS nations and Niger and froze all of the country's assets in ECOWAS banks.

Niger is an important but not a key player in the global uranium market. In 2022, it produced 2,000 tons of uranium (representing 4% of global production and placing it 7th in the world, just below Russia with its 2,500 tons). In recent years, uranium production in Niger has declined as the Akuta mine (operated by the French company Orano) depleted its reserves and finally closed in 2021. The major uranium assets in Niger are divided among four joint ventures. Orano is the largest shareholder in three of them, while Chinese companies (the state-owned CNUC and the private investment group ZXJOY Invest) control the fourth. There are also joint ventures with Spanish (ENUSA) and South Korean (KEPCO) companies. The Nigerien government is represented in the joint ventures through the state-owned company SOPAMIN.

For Niger, the sale of uranium is the main source of export revenue and hard currency. Uranium exports account for about $200 million annually (up to 30% of Niger's total export value). Most of this (up to 100% in some years) is shipped to France, with some shipments also going to Canada, Spain and Japan.

Along with Russia, Kazakhstan and Canada, Niger is a key supplier of uranium concentrate to France, providing about 25% of its annual consumption (France consumes approximately 8,000 tons per year). On July 31, the media reported that Niger had suspended uranium and gold exports to France. The rebels' decision, if it was indeed taken, was a political gesture: with closed borders, exports are technically impossible, as Niger has no access to the sea: if the border with Benin is closed by ECOWAS decision, the export reorientation needs time, effort, and international negotiations.

On the one hand, the prospect of France losing up to a quarter of its uranium supply threatens to intensify its ongoing energy predicament, a situation already complicated by the persistent two-year energy crisis sweeping across Europe. On the other hand, the rebels will struggle to find an alternative market for the 2,000 tons of uranium. In theory, Russian or Chinese companies could agree to buy these quantities of uranium concentrate (Russia consumes about 6,000 tons per year). However, this would require substantial investments in logistics, mine security, and above all, the neighboring countries would have to permit the transport of these cargoes through their territory.

If the rebels manage to stay in power and reach an agreement with Paris, France could use its influence in ECOWAS to negotiate sanctions relief. For example, uranium exports and shipments of mining equipment could be exempted. This is a fairly common practice - the embargo on Mali was modified to allow for food and energy.

When Niger declared its independence, the country's population was under 3.5 million. In the 60 years that followed it reached 25 million. Today, Niger is not only an important uranium supplier, but also a large market. It imports 3.5 billion worth of goods annually, primarily grain (0.5bn). It has outdone its neighbor Mali in terms of population, a country of the same size and geographic location between the Sahara Desert and the Sahel region. Whereas Mali's population merely quadrupled in the years since independence, Niger's population grew almost eight times. It is also telling that Niger is the world's leader in female fertility, leaving behind Somalia and Chad. In Niger, one woman gives birth to seven children on average. This has to do with the fact that Niger's population remains largely rural (83%) and lives in extreme poverty. Under these circumstances, a high birth rate is the way of ensuring existence for a community or extended family.

Over 3 million square kilometers of territory and 82 million people living in the ECOWAS countries are under ECOWAS sanctions now. Most of the ECOWAS territories (its total area amounting to 5.2mn sq km) are no longer a full-fledged part of the organization, which is now split into two areas coinciding with the two historical regions that Africa experts traditionally outline in West Africa - namely, Guinea, including the coastal West African territories from Senegal to Cameroon, and West Sudan, part of the Sahara/Sahel region. In fact, ECOWAS is split into two camps. One camp is represented by the four countries that have gone through coups d'etat (Mali in 2020 and 2021; Guinea in 2021; Burkina Faso in 2022), while the opposing camp includes Nigeria, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Senegal and others.

ECOWAS has always been a rather heterogeneous, diverse organization, with its population divided by both religious (Christianity vs Islam) and language (English vs French) affiliations. And also, there are two monetary arrangements within ECOWAS - the WAEMU (West African Economic and Monetary Union) that unites former French colonies in Africa and is also known as the CFA franc zone, and the WAMZ (West African Monetary Zone) that plans to introduce a single currency in ECOWAS - the Eco.

Moreover, there is no unity among the 'legitimate' member states of ECOWAS. Nigeria is the economic leader of all Africa and an apparent regional hegemon, which was once the mastermind behind the ECOWAS concept. Its potential and capabilities intimidate other regional actors, which is deftly used by external players. Until recently, France has used its ties to the countries of the region to exert pressure on Nigeria, including at the ECOWAS level. The country's economic protectionism annoyed the EU and was a major obstacle for a trade agreement between West Africa and the Europeans. That's what pushed Brussels, willing to leave Nigeria out, to sign separate deals with Ghana and Ivory Coast and use them as entry points to access the regional market of ECOWAS.

Coincidentally, Nigerian President Bola Tinubu was elected the next Chairman of ECOWAS on July 10, 2023. Now the crisis in Niger - Nigeria's northern neighbor facing the same kind of issues (radicalism, desertification, climate change) - provides an opportunity for Nigeria to bolster its influence in the region and become a vital player in resolving regional problems, capitalizing on the decline of France's clout. And it's far from certain that Nigeria will choose to play this game on the same side as France. We shouldn't overlook the fact that Nigeria's new president, Bola Tinubu, although born in the country's south, is Muslim and enjoys solid support in the north.

Russia has officially condemned the coup, a natural, consistent stance not related to Moscow's sympathies towards the Bazoum regime, as his administration chose not to attend the Russia-Africa Summit, taking cues from the US and France above all. Thus, Russia not only keeps in mind the 2014 coup in Ukraine, but also supports the African Union in its zero-tolerance policy towards coups.

Statements by Wagner PMC chief Evgeny Prigozhin in support of the coup should not be taken too seriously. Without support from the Kremlin, Prigozhin's resources in Africa are scant, and he already has a history of trying to look more powerful than he really is, resorting, among other things, to controlled leaks through opposition and European media. Therefore, any rumors of his involvement in the political process in Niger should be treated with caution. At any rate, Moscow's trust and support just aren't there for him anymore, and without those, he hardly carries much weight in Africa.

How events will develop in Niger is hard to forecast. Possible scenarios include countercoups and attempts by the West to come to an agreement with Niger's military, with the goal of making them refrain from doing anything that goes against the economic interests of France and the US. An armed intervention by ECOWAS is less likely, considering the unpreparedness of its regional rapid response forces and lack of resources.

Military involvement by France or the US is just as unlikely, as Western countries have far higher priorities in other parts of the world, such as Eastern Europe, the Indian Ocean, or the South China Sea. A coup in Niger is not something that can make the West give up its consistent policy of reducing its involvement in regional conflicts in the Middle East and Africa.

At the same time, we cannot rule out that France and the US may act independently of each other. The series of anti-French coups in Africa effectively plays into the hands of the US, whereas China - which often graciously accepts hidden courtesies extended by France in Africa as Paris seeks Beijing's support - may lose. The US may use the situation for its interests and put Niger's new military regime in a dependent position, strangling it with non-lethal sanctions, following a similar model as in Sudan.

Russia's long-term interest is in increasing weight and influence of the local centers of power, which includes not only Nigeria, but also Algeria, a strategic partner of Russia that keeps a close eye on the developments along its southern borders. It is in the interests of Algeria and Nigeria to prevent the crisis from internationalizing and settle it on their own, without the involvement of the US, France, and other players. Russia's role in this crisis could be a stabilizing one if it uses its friendly relations with the leaders of Burkina Faso and Mali, whose support will probably be sought by their peers in Niger.

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